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Public Health Confronts
The Chicken, The Hamster and 
The Goat
John Pape, Epidemiologist
Communicable Disease Epidemiology Program
Colorado Department of Public Health & Environment
Zoonoses: Diseases of animals transmissible to 
humans under natural conditions
Characteristics of Zoonoses
•common in natural reservior, uncommon in people
•rural exposure
•serious disease, high fatality rates
•complex cycles
•prevention via “The Weakest Link”
•zoonotic diseases comprise the majority of potential
bioterrorist agents and emerging infections
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Influenza, Avian Influenza,
and Pandemic Influenza

Wild Bird Population
Avian Influenza 
A Viruses
H1 – H16
H1 – H3
Human Influenza 
A Viruses
Influenza A Virus
Type A Influenza Viruses
• Host range: [humans, pigs, birds, horses, marine mammals]
• Antigens/surface proteins:
– Hemaglutinin (HA) Æ 16 distinct types (H1 - H16)
– Neuraminidase (NA) Æ 9 distinct types (N1 – N9)
• Human infections primarily:
– H1, H2, H3
– N1, N2 (? N8)
– Since 1977, H1N1  &  H3N2 have co-circulated
How Influenza Viruses Change
• Drift:
– Minor changes in structure of (H) and (N)
– Result of cumulative point mutations in viral RNA
– Occurs frequently Æ new “strain” (of A or B)
– Reason for updated vaccine formulation annually
• Shift:
– Major change thru reassortment (“swapping”) of RNA
– Result is new “virus subtype” (i.e. new “H” or “N”)
– Populations have no immunity to new subtype
– Occurs infrequently Æ may result in pandemic
Human
virus
Reassortant
virus
Non-human
virus
Mechanisms of Influenza Virus Antigenic “Shift”
16 HAs
9 NAs
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1997 H5N1 Outbreak, 
Hong Kong
•First evidence that AI viruses 
can directly infect people 
•H5N1’s unusual lethality
–6 deaths among 18 
hospitalizations
Primary risk factor:
Exposure to poultry in week 
before illness 
Outbreak stopped by culling 
all wholesale & vendor 
domestic chickens

Countries Affected by H5N1: July - Oct. 2005
Countries Affected by H5N1
and Major Migratory Birds’ Flyways
H5N1 Positive Eagles Smuggled 
into Belguim from Thailand
Economic Impact
Why H5N1 is of Particular Concern
• Progressively more pathogenic for poultry
• Asymptomatically infected domestic ducks are shedding virus for longer 
duration compared with 2003
• Expanding mammalian host range (tigers, leopards, cats)
• Virus able to survive days longer in the environment compared to 2003
• Ability to cause severe disease in humans
• Increasing poultry infections = increased human exposures / infections
• Increasing humans infections = increased chances of reassortment
– (e.g. H5N1 & H3N2)
Human H5N1 cases, Asia, Dec. 2003-06*
• 148 confirmed  Æ 79 deaths (53%)
• Vietnam:   93 cases Æ 42 deaths (45%)
• Thailand:  22 cases Æ 14 deaths (64%)
• Cambodia:  4 cases Æ 4 deaths (100%) 
• Indonesia:  17 cases Æ 12 deaths (71%)
• China:         8 cases Æ 5 death (63%) 
• Turkey: 4 cases    2 deaths (50%)
*As of January 14, 2006 (cases officially reported by WHO)
Limited Person-Person Transmission
• 15 family clusters identified Jan. 2004 – July 2005
¾ Emerg Infect Dis 2005;11:1799-1801
• Incidence of family clusters does not appear to be increasing   
(as a proportion of total cases)
• Most clusters compatible with common (poultry) exposure 
• Thailand (September 2004) 
¾ 11-year old girl cared for by mother and aunt in hospital, died, not confirmed; 
both women confirmed with H5N1, mother died
¾ NEJM 2005;352:333-40. 
• Vietnam (Feb. 2005)
¾ 2 nurses who cared for H5N1 patient were hospitalized with severe pneumonia
¾ 1 confirmed as H5N1
Pandemic Response Challenges
• Healthcare system capacity - overwhelmed
• Antiviral supplies – insufficient / resistance
• Vaccine – manufacturing issues / supply /distribution
• Critical infrastructure - disruption 
• Economy - disruption
Projected Pandemic Scenarios - COLORADO
Moderate (1958/68) Severe (1918-like)
Illness 1,394,644 1,394,644
Outpt. medical care 697,322 697,322
Hospitalizations 13,404 153,411
ICU care 1,995 23,012
Mechanical 
ventilation
1,005 11,506
Deaths 3,239 29,489
Challenges for Physicians
• Distinguish H5N1 from “normal” flu
• Worried Well
– Concerned of exposure
– Want bird flu vaccine
– Want oseltamivir
• Should I stockpile oseltamivir?
H5N1 Surveillance Strategy in US
• Focus on severe resp. illness plus travel history
– Unexplained pneumonia or ARDS
– Travel w/in 10 days to area w/ H5N1 in poultry/humans
• Contact & Airborne precautions 
• Testing:
– PCR for influenza (type A & H5N1) @ State Lab
– If PCR+ Æ Culture & subtyping @ CDC 






Baylisascaris procyonis
Procyon lotor

Baylisascaris Adult Worms
• Fully grown 15-20 cm
• 50-80% adult raccons carry worms
– 90% in juvenile animals 
• 2-3 months from infection to shedding eggs
• Asymptomatic infections
– Obstruction, malnutrition, intussusception
Baylisascais Eggs
• Infected raccoons shed in feces
– 20 – 100,000 eggs/gm (100 gm/defecation)
• Eggs infective in 30 days 
• Highly resistant
– Lab frig for 12 years
– 3-5 years in soil
– Resistant to most disinfectants
• Sticky
• Treat by flaming, boiling lye/lysol

Baylisascaris Larvae
• Raccoons
– Ingest eggs or encysted larvae
• Intermediate host
– Penetrate intestine & migrate throughout body
• Larvae in lung 12-18 hours after ingestion, brain by day 3
– Encyst in muscle, liver, lungs
– Affinity for nerve tissue – 5-15% reach brain
– Grow to 1.5-2mm during migration
• Impact depends on number of larvae, tissue 
involved and size of host






Baylisascaris Prevention
• No pet raccoons
• Assume infected until treated
– Negative stool culture   =   not infected
• Exclude from chimneys, attics, woodpiles
• Protect feed, hay, bedding 
• Special problems for rehabilitators
• Hand-washing, hand-washing, hand-washing
Q Fever
• Highly infectious by aerosol route
• Persists in resistant spore-like form
• Febrile illness – self-limited FUO
– Asymptomatic infections common
– Low mortality
• Common in sheep/goats
– Heavy shedding during birthing
• High infectivity and durability make 
it an ideal incapacitating biological 
warfare agent
Q Fever
• 25 cases reported
– 12 probable, 10 confirmed
– 3 clusters Weld (n=5), Rio Blanco (n=2), Pueblo
• From 2000-2004: 12 reported cases (2.4/year)
• Exposures
– owned livestock (n=9) or lived next to livestock (n=4) 
– contact with goats (n=9)
– large animal veterinarian, abattoir worker and exposure 
to a livestock barn
• Highly undiagnosed disease
Q-fever Outbreak Associated 
with Goats
• Report of case in September 2005
– Pt had assisted with birthing goats
• Ranch has recently purchased 360 head
– ~20% stillbirth rate June-August
• Horse boarders had assisted with birthing
• Conducted cohort study and environmental 
assessment

Q-fever Outbreak Associated 
with Goats
• Sixty-eight persons with potential exposure
– 66 interviewed; 37 (56%) provide blood
– 18 persons (49%) had serological evidence of 
infection; 9 ill / 9 asymptomatic
• 40 soil samples from pens/pasture
– 9 (23%) confirmed, 12 (30%) presumptive +
• 51 goats tested (vaginal and/or milk)
– 7 positive (2 vaginal, 3 milk, 2 both)

Q-fever Outbreak Associated 
with Goats
• Risk associated with goat contact
– Any goat contact RR 3.4 (0.9-12.3) p=0.02
– Contact with newborn RR 2.3 (1.7-2.6) p=0.01
– Pull goats RR 2.1 (1.3-3.6) p=0.04
• No risk from petting goats, time spent on 
the ranch or any activities associated with 
horses
Hamsters & Tularemia
• April 2004
– 3 yo boy reported with tularemia
• Isolate from excised axillary lymph node (3/31)
• January 2004 
– Family purchased 1st hamster 
– Bitten Feb 4; onset Feb 11
• Pet store noted hamster die-off
– No hamsters available for testing 
– 1 store cat + tularemia antibody titer
• No other cases in employees (n=2) or hamster 
purchasers (n=15)
Hamsters & Tularemia
• October 2005
– CDPHE notified of 2 shipments of hamsters 
possibly infected with tularemia
– Store indicated ½ of one shipment DOA
• 4/6 carcasses positive
• Doxycycline Rx
– 2 employees–negative
• No further cases ID
• CDPHE initiated routine tularemia testing
– What to do with this information?
• Six human cases
– 1 pneumonia – likely lawn mowing associated
– 1 rabbit contact, 2 arthropod bite, 2 unk
• 23/192 (12%) specimens tularemia positive
– 16 rabbits, 6 squirrels, 1 cat
• Tularemia cycles in patterns similar to plague
Year of the Rodent 
Tularemia Cases by Year,
Colorado, 1975-2005*
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* Provisional data for 2005








• Record year for HPS cases (n=11)
– Only 1 fatality
• First 28 cases – 14 fatal (50%)
• Last 20 cases – 3 fatal (15%)
• Cases reported statewide 
– 3 from SLV 
– SLV accounts for 11/48 (23%) of CO cases
• Two study sites (LaPlata/Mesa counties) showed increased 
deer mouse populations and rising infection rates in Fall 
’04 and Spring ’05
Year of the Rodent 
Sin Nombre Virus
John Pape, Epidemiologist
Communicable Disease Epidemiology Program
Colorado Department of Public Health & 
Environment
303-692-2628 john.pape@state.co.us
in Colorado
Deer mouse
Cotton rat


• Record year for HPS cases (n=11)
– Only 1 fatality
• First 28 cases – 14 fatal (50%)
• Last 20 cases – 3 fatal (15%)
• Cases reported statewide 
– 3 from SLV 
– SLV accounts for 12/49 (24%) of CO cases
• Two study sites (LaPlata/Mesa counties) showed increased 
deer mouse populations and rising infection rates in Fall 
’04 and Spring ’05
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Survived Fatal
Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome (N=48+) by 
Year and Outcome, Colorado, 1993-2005
+   fatal case from 1985 not shown

Sin Nombre Virus Antibody Prevelance of Deer 
Mice, LaPlata County, CO, 1994-2005
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Sin Nombre Virus Antibody Prevelance of Deer Mice, Mesa County, CO
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Case Demographics
• All Cases
– Median age: 33 (range 12 – 69) years
– 28 male (57%)
• Fatal Cases
– Median age: 30.5 (range 15 – 69) years
– 10 male (58%)
Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome Cases (n=49) by 
Month of Onset and Outcome, Colorado, 1985-2005
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Survived Fatal
Colorado Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome Cases,
By Residence, 1985-2005
• Flu syndrome without rhinorhea, otitis, sinusitis, congestion,             
sneezing
• Nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain are often severe if present
• Cough does not begin on the first day of symptoms; begins after 
two or more days, accompanied by progressive dyspnea and   
heralds the onset of pulmonary edema
• During the prodrome , thrombocytopenia is the only lab sign
• A rapidly falling platelet count helps differentiate HPS
Clinical Clues for HPS
How do you find rare HPS among thousands of flu syndromes?

Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome
Prevention Recommendations
• Rodent-proof  homes, barns and outbuildings
• Eliminate rodent harborage and food supplies
• Conduct ongoing rodent population reduction
• Use special precautions when working in or
cleaning rodent-infested environments
Year of the Rodent 
• First significant state-wide plague activity 
since 1992-94
– Six human cases (1 fatal) since August ’04
• 2 rabbit hunters, 4 flea bite
– 65 /265 (25%) plague specimens positive
• 16 cats, 1 dog, 20 flea pools, 21 rodents, 
2 rabbits, 7 coyotes
Human Plague Cases 
Colorado, 1974-2005 (n=48)*
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* Not included are 5 cases (2 fatal) occurring between 1957-1973
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